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In July 2013, ECB President Mario Draghi and euro zone debt markets dominated the protagonist's thoughts. After dramatic convergence in euro zone long-term rates during the late 1990s, the "Great Convergence" had given way to the "Great Divergence," in which German yields reached a record low of 1.22% in summer 2012 while Greek yields were bouncing between 20% and 40%. Periphery bond markets improved sharply in late summer 2012 after Draghi committed to do "whatever it takes" to preserve the euro. Perhaps the worst was over. But some, including the IMF, were skeptical, warning about centrifugal forces across the euro area that were pulling down growth everywhere. The protagonist had two decisions to make. First, what was the path of core (i.e., German) euro zone long-term interest rates likely to be over the next year? Was the dramatic decline in German long rates over the past few years an aberration that would soon be reversed, or was it part of the "new normal" that would persist for some time? Second, how would periphery long rates evolve relative to core rates? That is?the spread between long rates in the likes of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (GIIPS) and those in Germany?how would they evolve over the next year? Which was to be expected: another dramatic divergence in euro zone long rates, as euro zone politicians again disappointed, or a continuation of the impressive reconvergence that began in the second half of 2012? Was Draghi's commitment to preserve the euro enough or would the monetary union be torn apart by forces against which the central bank was powerless? This case is used in Darden's first- and second-year Global Financial Markets electives. It is appropriate for economics courses covering international and macro topics and for courses in international finance.